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As speculative attacks against Member States persist, the European Union (EU) desperately is 
attempting to allay fears concerning the disintegration of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). 
Much of the firepower for this onslaught is provided by these very financial intermediaries 
charged with assessing and communicating the health of euro area economies; namely credit 
rating agencies (CRAs). Thus, in 2008, the European Commission proposed a series of oversight 
initiatives which would centralise CRA supervision at the EU level. Endorsed by the High Level 
Group on Financial Supervision,1 chaired by Jacques de Larosière, Regulation (EC) No 
1060/2009 (CRA Regulation v1) came into effect on 7 December 2010. Shortly thereafter, the 
corresponding amendment (EU) No 513/2011 (CRA Regulation v2) was deemed necessary in 
order to compensate for outstanding issues.  
Already, however, there are serious questions about whether these new multilateral 
measures are sufficient enough to prevent Europe from being held hostage by the procyclical 
behaviour of a cabal of private firms: Moody’s Investors Services, Standard & Poor’s (S&P) and 
Fitch Ratings. In fact, the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) is busy designing 
the third regulatory framework to supplement these existing CRA regulations. It is due to be 
announced at the beginning of 2012. But will it be too late to salvage the current configuration 
of EMU or even be effective in redressing some of the most egregious elements of ratings? 
Extreme volatility now threatens the eurozone’s largest economies; including France. Not even 
the United States is immune. In this attempt to correct some of the numerous offences with which 
EU officials have charged the CRAs, the European Commission published its 5 November 2010 
consultation paper on credit rating agencies.2 To reduce an overreliance on external ratings, inject 
                                               
1 European Securities Markets Experts Group, Role of Credit Rating Agencies (Brussels, 6 June 2008). 
2 Commission of the European Communities, Public Consultation on Credit Rating Agencies, (Brussels, 5 
November 2010, IP/10/1471). 
competition into the ratings space and enhance the transparency of the entire process, a structural 
solution is being entertained in the form of an EU credit rating agency. But is this the right 
approach?  
 Cause for grave concern among EU official is well warranted. Whether it was their haste 
in downgrading sovereign debt during the 1998 Asian crisis, their inability to foresee the collapse 
of fraudulent corporate giants like Enron (2001) and Parmalat (2003), or their assignment of high 
investment grade ratings to dubious subprime mortgage-backed securities, which contributed to 
the 2008 credit crisis, credit ratings agencies have been implicated in some of the most severe 
and destabilising financial and fiscal crises of the last two decades. Procyclicality is observed as 
negative downgrades hinder debt financing, dampen economic growth and thus precipitate 
further decreases. Irrespective of the ensuing political outrage and promises to correct such 
abuses, ratings agencies have managed to elude any serious regulation. 
Now as the integrity of the monetary union itself is undermined, it is tempting to believe 
that the (re)politicisation of this largely depoliticised field of finance will have the desired 
countercyclical effects and restore stability to beleaguered Member States and financial markets. 
Yet can a quasi-public EU CRA actually correct some of these imbalances and inconsistencies 
evident in the ratings space or simply exacerbate them? This paper contends that this is a 
misguided approach that can only infuse more uncertainty about the quality of ratings, heighten 
the dependence on external forms of assessment, and undermine the EU’s authority to manage 
effectively the sovereign debt crisis. Arguably, the current regulatory framework is inadequate 
as it fails to address principal problems, such as a fallacious analytics of ratings. But an EU credit 
rating agency can only entrench such distortions and amplify destabilising ‘cliff effects’ as it 
cedes further sovereign authority to market forces.   
 
Sovereign Ratings  
Sovereign rating ranges rest on a judgement – codified and commercialised as the ‘risk of default’ 
– about ‘the capacity and willingness’ of governments to raise the necessary resources for the 
timely servicing of their debt obligations.3 Probability of payment must be concomitant with the 
tolerability of the costs of austerity/adjustment. Yet as the ‘pain’ threshold which a constituency 
can endure fluctuates according to its changing political economy, it escapes prescient 
quantification as a probability distribution through the utilitarian calculus of risk. Politics is just 
                                               
3 Moody’s Investor Services,  Moody’s Rating Methodology: Sovereign Bond Rating (New York:  
Moody’s Investor Services, 2008), 4. 
too fluid and uncertain to be captured statistically; even in an ordinal range. Sovereigns rarely 
default in the way that corporates fail. Nevertheless, in their attempt to make the qualitative more 
quantitative, the ‘opinions’ that Moody’s or S&P issues about this governmental capacity seem 
to be widely accepted. Coming to terms with this analytics of ratings and properly regulating it 
is pivotal to an effective EU policy response. Thus far, the EU has been reluctant to regulate the 
flawed analytics underpinning ratings themselves, which leaves Europe susceptible to further 
destabilising forces. 
 
Overreliance on External Ratings  
In part, the scope and authority of ratings derives from their ‘certification’ role. Institutionalised 
in regulatory capital requirements, certification is intended to identify whose ratings are 
appropriate for regulatory purposes in the EU. In order to be eligible as collateral for money 
market operations, securities typically must have an investment-grade for central banks to accept 
them. Financial contracts and the by-laws of corporations have similar suitability criteria. The 
European Central Bank’s (ECB) ‘credit quality threshold’ is defined in terms of BBB+/Baa1 in 
its harmonised rating scale. Of course, as the recent cases of Ireland and Greece demonstrate, 
minimum credit rating thresholds can be suspended. Now the ECB will accept Greek defaulted 
bonds as collateral. Given Greece’s tremendous medium-term solvency challenges coupled with 
Germany’s move to recapitalise its own banks exposed to Greek debt, its default is imminent.  
What is very odd, however, is that rather than removing references or reliance upon 
ratings, the ESMA registration process merely serves to enhance their status and the legitimacy 
of rating agencies. Lessons should have been learned from the ‘Nationally Recognized Statistical 
Rating Organizations’ (NRSRO) designation in the United States; of which there are ten. Only 
recently has the Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 introduced criteria detailing what the 
NRSRO designation actually entails. Prior to 2006, however, certification by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) was quite informal, which actually erected barriers to entry and 
solidified the duopoly enjoyed by Moody’s and S&P. Ostensibly, this can repeat itself in the 
European context or dilute the lower-tiers of the ratings industry with a slew of relatively 
‘insignificant’ rating agencies; the EU CRA amongst them. Such players are no match against 
goliaths the likes of Moody’s or S&P who, in 2011, rated 112 and 126 sovereigns, respectively. 
Even Kroll Bond Rating Agency (KBRA) – at 59 sovereign ratings – is not considered as a 
potential challenger to these global full-spectrum rating agencies. Most new entrants simply 
appear resolved at carving out niche specialisations.  
Beginning in 2009 with the Financial Reform Act (Subtitle C of Title IX), however, the 
US initiated a campaign to eliminate references to NRSRO ratings in certain statutes. The 2010 
Dodd-Frank Act (Section 6009) continued this expungement. Reducing the mechanistic reliance 
on CRA ratings is also advocated by the Financial Stability Board (FSB).4 Yes, alternative 
provisions first have to be identified and implemented. But an EU CRA and ESMA registration 
can have the opposite effect and institutionalise the significance of external ratings rather than 
remove them. At that stage, viable alternatives would be even more difficult to devise and 
operationalise. Even if the EU decided to expel Moody’s or S&P, what prevents them from 
issuing ratings from their headquarters in New York? 
By officially sanctioning the current practice, without correcting the fallacious analytics 
of ratings, I argue that the EU enhances the legitimacy of external, exogenous forms of 
assessment. Ratings, per se, are not problematic. Although ratings address the problem of 
asymmetric information between issuers of debt and investors, their informational value and 
marginal utility is minimal given that much of this knowledge already has been priced into market 
expectations. More sophisticated investors (e.g. PIMCO, Paulson & Co.) perform their own 
internal risk assessments and don’t rely on Moody’s or S&P to help them understand and evaluate 
creditworthiness. Arguably, a primary appeal of ratings is as an inexpensive form of outsourced 
due diligence. Failure, however, to conduct proper internal risk assessments often precipitates a 
crisis. External ratings may represent value of simplicity but accuracy suffers.  
Given the uncertainty in calculating the risk of sovereign default, investors attempt to 
minimise such costs while searching for potential arbitrage opportunities. Irrespective of their 
actual quality, as regulatory licenses, ratings provide the chance for investors to capitalise on the 
creditworthiness differentials of Member States. Disparate governments become synchronically 
connected and comparable as ratings entitle them to varying degrees of accessibility to liquid 
capital markets. In other words, speculators now have the instruments with which to exploit the 
relative vulnerability of individual governments. Would these market participants even listen to 
an EU sponsored agency making claims about the health of its distressed masters? One cannot 
help but be incredulous of such assertions.  
 
Reputational Capital  
Without doubt, the constitution of authoritative knowledge relies on credibility. Given the 
tremendous intersubjective barriers to entry, market share in the ratings space is not easily gained; 
                                               
4 Financial Stability Board, Principles for Reducing Reliance on CRA Ratings (Basel: FSB, 2010). 
hence the present hegemony of the Big Two and a Half – Fitch is a distant third. In 2009, 
Moody’s, S&P and Fitch issued an astonishing 97 per cent of all outstanding ratings across all 
categories. An EU CRA would need to convince these market participants – essentially the entire 
ratings market – to abandon Moody’s or S&P and pay it to assess their creditworthiness. A solid 
reputation for impartiality and competence would be essential for its success. Here the EU’s 
patronage can diminish any credibility which this quasi-public agency seeks to establish. Thus, 
an EU CRA must possess a substantial degree of independence. Of course, that is easier said than 
done.  
Moody’s and S&P’s authoritative ascendance dates back to the rise of market 
surveillance mechanisms in the mid-nineteenth century. Henry V. Poor’s was one of the first to 
systematically document the growing American industrial complex with the 1860 publication, 
History of the Railroads and Canals of the United States of America. Industrial statistics occupied 
John Moody’s 1900 Manual of Industrial and Miscellaneous Securities, which included 
information about the stocks and bonds of financial firms and government institutions. 
Unfortunately, an EU CRA would not have the luxury of such a grace period. With the arrival of 
new CRAs, whatever minimal market share exists will further diminish, thus forcing many 
smaller firms out of the industry all together while elevating the status of Moody’s and S&P.  
  The current sovereign debt crisis only complicates this credibility dilemma. Although at 
first adamantly opposed by the European Central Bank, after their 21 July 2011 Euro Area 
Summit, EU politician finally admitted what financial markets had long suspected: Greece has 
little alternative but to restructure its debt obligations. Reiterating their previous warnings, the 
main credit rating agencies announced that Greece’s failure to meet its interest or principal 
payments in a timely fashion or on ‘less favourable terms’ constitutes ‘selective’ default.5 
Moody’s confirmed that ‘the probability of a distressed exchange, and hence a default, on Greek 
government bonds is virtually 100%’.6 On the one hand, if the real objective of an EU CRA 
would be to lessen the burden on beleaguered Member States then it would be a farce. By no 
means is an EU CRA a viable solution to the chronic uncompetitiveness and fiscal profligacy 
that plagues the periphery economies of EMU. On the other hand, if this agency were to possess 
all the capacities and independence of a Moody’s or S&P then it would be exactly like them. 
                                               
5 Standard & Poor’s, When Would A “Reprofiling” Of Sovereign Debt Constitute A Default? (New York: Standard 
& Poor’s, 2011). 
6 Moody’s Investor Services, Moody's Downgrades Greece to Ca from Caa1, Developing Outlook (New York: 
Moody’s Investor Services, 2011). 
Why would it behave in any other way? Again, both approaches would simply compound the 
difficulties facing the EU in managing effectively its sovereign debt crisis.  
 
Conflicts of Interest 
Discussions of potential conflicts of interest often focus on the remunerations models employed 
by rating agencies. As profit-maximising entities, CRAs earn the vast majority of their revenue 
from the fees that they charge issuers of debt. But this was not always the case. Prior to the 
creation of the NRSRO designation in the 1970s, subscription fees were the norm. Today, 
however, about 90 per cent of CRA income is derived from user fees. McGraw-Hill Financial, 
the parent company of S&P Ratings, generated a revenue stream of US$2.9 billion in 2010; while 
rating in excess of US$32 trillion in outstanding debt. With reported revenue of US$2.03 billion 
in 2010, Moody’s Corporation was also quite profitable. Its first quarter revenue for 2011 jumped 
21 per cent to US$577.1 million. Both Moody’s and S&P have similar fees. S&P charges issuers 
of corporate debt up to 4.25 basis points for most transactions; with a minimum fee of US$70 
000. Sovereigns can pay anywhere from US$60 000 to US$100 000. Although ancillary 
practices, such as consulting, contributed to their business, stipulations in the EU regulatory 
framework prohibit CRAs from providing advisory services.  
 Revenue dependence on user fees has been suggested as a potential source of conflict of 
interest. Grade inflation may attract more clients and, thus greater profits as issuers have an 
incentive to ‘shop around’ as they solicit the most favourable assessment. Such concerns may be 
warranted in regards to smaller CRAs. Moody’s and S&P, however, are so well entrenched and 
command such tremendous market share that they are virtually immune from such pressures. 
Moreover, given the fragility of credibility, rating agencies have a vested interest in preserving 
and enhancing their reputation for impartiality. Although an EU CRA may not be primarily 
motivated by the bottom-line, grade inflation is a tempting low cost and highly effective strategy 
to entice new clients away from its well established competitors. Of course, in its nascent stages 
of trial and error, it is completely reasonable to expect a degree of overzealousness and 
inconsistency. Whether issuers would tolerate this volatility given the available alternatives is 
doubtful. 
 In addition to the ‘user-pays’ model, in its 2010 consultation paper, the Commission 
identified other possible options to stimulate competition between CRAs. The ‘subscriber/ 
investor-pays’ model would require institutional investors to obtain their own rating before they 
can buy a financial instrument. Issuers of debt would select the rating agency of their choice. The 
ambition is the creation of a ‘subscriber-pays’ rating market. However, the ‘issuer-pays’ 
approach was a response to the ‘free-riding problem’ of nonsubscribers accessing published 
ratings. In today’s information society, the confidentiality upon which the ‘subscriber-pays’ 
model rests would be impossible. Furthermore, the unsolicited ratings which this standard 
promotes can be deployed in a coercive fashion in order to increase a rating’s circulation. 
Moody’s conflict with the German reinsurer Hannover Rückversicherung AG is indicative of 
this dark side to unsolicited ratings. What would prevent an EU CRA from engaging in such 
tactics in order to drum up business? As it stands, the EU remains ambiguous about which 
business model, if any, it should endorse.  
 As troubling as the above issues are, where a conflict of interest is most blatant is in 
having an EU-sponsored rating agency assess the creditworthiness of its sovereign masters. 
Rating one’s own debt is laughable. It is doubtful whether Brussels is actually concerned with 
how well Moody’s or S&P appraise the economic health of a country such as Pakistan or Chile. 
The Commission is witnessing the disintegration of the eurozone and it wants a countercyclical 
safeguard to protect its ailing economies from any future onslaught. Whether there is actual merit 
to this position is really irrelevant. Market optics would portray a quasi-public EU CRA as a 
puppet of the national governments with which it is affiliated. This would destroy its credibility 
and tarnish the reputation of the Member States. 
 
Two-Tier Rating System  
Few would dispute that increased competition in the ratings space would be positive. Granting 
ratings agencies access to the information of issuers which do not employ them may promote 
independent ratings. But even the ECB questions if an EU CRA would enhance competition or 
simply erect artificial barriers to entry to the detriment of private rivals.7 Taking into 
consideration the arguments outlined above, it is difficult to imagine how a quasi-public EU 
rating agency can accumulate the necessary reputational capital to compete with the likes of 
Moody’s or S&P. If their oligopoly can be disturbed, then it will not be instantaneous. In fact, as 
I contend, an EU CRA may have the adverse effect of further cementing their dominance. This 
would create a two-tier rating system where the EU CRA plays a peripheral role relative to 
Moody’s or S&P. To level the playing field and compel market participants to adopt the new 
agency’s ratings, market distorting mechanism would be necessary. Otherwise, this asymmetry 
would undermine the position of the new EU CRA as a reputable alternative. 
                                               
7 European Central Bank, European Commission’s Public Consultation on Credit Rating Agencies –  
Eurosystem Reply (Frankfurt: ECB, 2011). 
 Preoccupation with the quantity of ratings, however, distracts attention away from the 
real problem: their dubious quality. Rating agencies have a dismal record of predicting the 
deterioration of economic positions. Only in less than 25 per cent of cases have Moody’s and 
S&P cut a sovereign rating before the onset of a correction. Most downgrades occur once a crisis 
has already begun. Risk calculus divorces ratings from the messy and uncertain world of fiscal 
politics. It imposes an artificial budgetary normality onto the European political economy, 
thereby attempting to eliminate the alterity that exists between Member States.  
Heterogeneous economies, however, cannot be reduced to probabilistic estimation of risk 
default. Uncertainty cannot be calculated and (mis)represented as a risk. CRAs claim not to 
design ratings as a probabilistically quantifiable frequency denoting the credit event of default or 
expected loss, but rather ordinal rankings of credit risk. Nevertheless, key (qualitative) political 
determinants, such as the stability and legitimacy of political institutions or the transparency of 
policy decisions, are framed in absolute risk terms in order to be tractable to the rational choice 
scenarios and stress tests implicit in CRA propriety models. Without any clear alternative to 
measuring creditworthiness, an EU CRA is bound to adopt this fallacious analytics of ratings. 
Thus, the end result will be even more suspect external assessments that threaten to cause even 
more instability and undermine EU efforts in managing its sovereign debt woes.  
 
Conclusion 
There is no simple method to regulate and sanction informal judgement. Although additional 
measures are necessary to compensate for the inadequacies of the existing CRA framework, I 
posit that a quasi-public EU rating agency is not the solution. Rather than reducing the 
mechanistic overreliance on external forms of assessment, an EU CRA can have the effect of 
actually heightening this dependence. ESMA registration can contribute to institutionalising the 
status of ratings while it dilutes the lower rungs of the ratings industry. That can only enhance 
the legitimacy of Moody’s or S&P. Severe conflicts of interest will compound these challenges. 
Neither does this proposal redress the fallacious analytics of ratings and their poor quality. 
Overall, an EU CRA can undermine the EU’s authority to manage effectively the sovereign debt 
crisis. 
 
 
